Ransomware response playbook (NGO, 20 staff)

Trigger

Any of these means ransomware:

  • Files suddenly have strange extensions (.locked, .encrypted, .crypt, random letters)

  • Ransom note appears on screen or in folders (TXT, HTML, or image file)

  • Can’t open files that worked yesterday

  • Desktop wallpaper changed to ransom demand

  • Multiple staff report files becoming inaccessible

If you see any of these: STOP. Follow this playbook immediately.

Immediate Actions (First 5 Minutes)

1. Don’t panic, but move fast

Person who discovers it:

  • Take a photo of the ransom note with your phone (don’t copy/paste, don’t touch files)

  • Note the time you first noticed

  • Shout for help (literally—get others’ attention)

2. Disconnect everything

Everyone in the office:

  • Unplug network cables from affected computers (pull them out)

  • Turn off WiFi on affected laptops (airplane mode or switch off)

  • DO NOT shut down computers yet—we may need forensics

  • Stop others from logging in to shared drives or systems

Why: Ransomware spreads through networks. Isolation stops it spreading to more systems.

3. Alert the response team

Call these people immediately (in this order until someone answers):

  1. IT Manager: [Name] - [Mobile] - [Email]

  2. Director: [Name] - [Mobile] - [Email]

  3. External IT Support: [Company] - [Phone] - [Email]

Say: “We have ransomware. [X] computers affected. Following the playbook. Need help now.”

Investigation (Next 30 Minutes)

IT Manager or External IT Support leads this:

4. Assess the damage

Walk around and check:

  • How many computers are affected? (List them)

  • Are servers affected? (Check if you can access shared drives)

  • When did this start? (Check timestamps on ransom notes or encrypted files)

  • Is it still spreading? (Are more files getting encrypted right now?)

Document everything: Write it down or type in a safe device (your phone, a clean laptop).

5. Check backups

Critical question: Do we have clean backups?

Check:

  • When was the last backup? (Today? Yesterday? Last week?)

  • Are backups physically disconnected or in separate cloud account? (If they’re on the same network, they might be encrypted too)

  • Can you access backups right now? (Test access, don’t restore yet)

If backups are also encrypted or inaccessible: Note this. You’re in a worse position but not hopeless.

6. Identify the ransomware (if possible)

  • Take clear photos of ransom notes

  • Note any file extensions or filenames

  • Check ID Ransomware if you can access internet safely

  • Knowing the variant helps determine if decryption is possible

Decisions (Within 1 Hour)

Director + IT Manager decide together:

Decision 1: Do we have working backups?

YES - We have recent, clean, accessible backups: → Go to Recovery Plan A (restore from backup) → Do NOT pay ransom → Skip to Section: Recovery from Backup

NO - Backups are encrypted, missing, or too old: → Go to Recovery Plan B (damage control) → Consider whether to pay (but read warnings first) → Skip to Section: Recovery Without Backup

Decision 2: Do we report this?

For NGOs with sensitive beneficiary data or operating in restricted environments:

  • Consider safety implications of reporting (could it expose beneficiaries or partners?)

  • Balance transparency against operational security

  • Document your reasoning either way

Legal/regulatory obligations:

  • If you process personal data (GDPR applies): likely need to report within 72 hours

  • If you’re in critical sector or have government contracts: check if mandatory reporting applies

  • Document your assessment

Who to potentially notify:

  • Data protection authority (if GDPR applies and personal data affected)

  • Insurance company (if you have cyber insurance)

  • Donors/partners (if their data affected)

  • Law enforcement (optional in most jurisdictions, but can provide intelligence)

Recovery Plan A: Restore from Backup

If you have good backups, follow these steps:

7. Isolate and clean infected systems

Before restoring anything:

  • Keep infected computers offline and isolated

  • Scan all other computers with antivirus (use free tools: Microsoft Defender, Malwarebytes)

  • Change all passwords from a clean device (email, cloud services, admin accounts)

  • Check for persistence (look for scheduled tasks, startup items, suspicious programs)

Consider: Rebuilding infected machines from scratch is safer than trying to clean them. Back up any critical files first (after scanning), then wipe and reinstall.

8. Restore from backup

In this order:

  1. Servers first (if you have them)

  2. Critical systems (whatever you absolutely need to operate)

  3. Everyone else’s computers

Test before going live:

  • Restore to isolated system first

  • Check files open properly

  • Scan restored files for malware

  • Only reconnect to network when clean

9. Verify and monitor

After restoration:

  • Check file integrity (open documents, test systems)

  • Monitor for 48 hours (is anything still acting weird?)

  • Keep backups of the infected state (for forensics or insurance claims)

Expected downtime: 1-3 days depending on data volume and help available.

Recovery Plan B: Without Working Backup

This is harder. You have limited options.

10. Assess what you’ve lost

Be honest about the damage:

  • What data is encrypted?

  • What’s the impact if we never recover it?

  • Do we have any copies anywhere else? (old laptops, personal devices, email attachments, cloud syncs)

  • What’s our worst-case scenario?

11. Check for free decryption tools

Some ransomware variants have known decryptions:

12. Consider paying ransom (carefully)

Before you even think about paying:

Arguments against:

  • No guarantee you’ll get your data back (many don’t)

  • Funds criminal activity

  • May violate sanctions (some ransomware groups are sanctioned entities)

  • You become a known payer (may be targeted again)

  • Even if you get decryption key, files may be corrupted

Arguments for (rare cases only):

  • Data is irreplaceable and critical to life-saving work

  • No other recovery option exists

  • Financial impact of loss exceeds ransom cost

  • Legal and ethical considerations allow it

If you decide to pay:

  • Consult legal counsel first (sanctions risk is real)

  • Consider using professional negotiation/recovery service

  • Document decision and rationale

  • Expect this to take days and cost more than the initial demand

  • Assume data may be sold/leaked anyway (many double-extort)

13. Rebuild from scratch

If you can’t decrypt and won’t pay:

  • Wipe all infected systems completely

  • Reinstall operating systems from scratch

  • Restore what you can from partial backups, cloud services, old devices

  • Recreate what you can’t recover

  • Accept the data loss and document lessons learned

Expected downtime: 1-2 weeks or more, depending on extent of loss.

Communication

Internal

To all staff (within 4 hours):

Subject: Security Incident - Ransomware

We've experienced a ransomware attack affecting [X] systems.

Current status: [Contained/Under investigation/Recovering]

What you need to do:
- Don't access shared drives until cleared
- Change your passwords immediately (email, cloud services)
- Report any suspicious files or behaviour
- Don't click links or open attachments unless verified

Next update: [time]

Questions: Contact [Name]

External (if required)

To donors/partners (within 24 hours if their data affected):

Subject: Security Incident Notification

We're writing to inform you of a security incident that occurred on [date].

What happened: Ransomware attack affecting [brief description]

What data was affected: [Specific description if known, or "under investigation"]

What we're doing: [Containment, recovery, investigation]

What you should do: [Specific actions if any, or "no action required"]

Questions: [Contact]

Keep it factual. Don’t speculate. Update as you learn more.

Prevention (after recovery)

Once you’re back online, fix these immediately:

Critical fixes (do this week)

  1. Backup properly:

    • Daily backups of all critical data

    • One copy offsite or in separate cloud account

    • Test restores monthly (actually try restoring, don’t just check that backup ran)

  2. Email security:

    • Block .exe, .zip, .js, .vbs attachments

    • Enable warning banners on external emails

    • Train everyone on phishing (show examples)

  3. Updates:

    • Turn on automatic updates for Windows

    • Update all software (especially web browsers)

    • Replace anything you can’t update

  4. Access control:

    • Remove admin rights from daily-use accounts

    • Implement MFA on email and cloud services

    • Review who has access to what

Important fixes (do this month)

  1. Endpoint protection:

    • Install and maintain good antivirus (Windows Defender is fine, just keep it on)

    • Enable ransomware protection in Windows Security

  2. Network segmentation:

    • Guest WiFi separate from work WiFi

    • Servers isolated if you have them

  3. Monitoring:

    • Log and review login attempts

    • Monitor for suspicious file activity

    • Set up alerts for mass file changes

Document what happened

  • Timeline of attack and response

  • What worked and what didn’t

  • Total cost (downtime, recovery, lost productivity)

  • Changes implemented

  • Share lessons with peer organisations

Key contacts

Fill this in and print it out. Keep a copy at home.

Role

Name

Mobile

Email

Backup Person

IT Manager

Director

External IT Support

Insurance Provider

Legal Counsel

Data Protection Contact

Emergency services

  • Police (non-emergency): [local number]

  • Cyber crime reporting: [national cyber centre]

Useful resources

Version control playbook

Current Version: 1.0
Last Updated: [Date]
Next Review: [Date in 6 months]
Owner: [Name]

Update this playbook after:

  • Any ransomware incident (within 1 week)

  • Staff changes affecting key contacts

  • IT system changes (new backup system, new tools)

  • Every 6 months minimum

Notes

This playbook assumes:

  • Limited IT resources (one part-time person or external support)

  • No complex infrastructure (no domain controllers, limited servers)

  • Priority is getting back to work, not forensic perfection

  • Operation in environments where reporting may have safety implications

If you have more resources: Get professional incident response help. This playbook is for “we are on our own and need to act now” situations.

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