The visibility problem

Playbooks assume attacker visibility into their own actions. Scenarios must not.

From the playbook, Phase 2 Action 2.1 (fraudulent ROA creation) is the control-plane attack. It’s the moment where the Registry gets poisoned. It’s the critical action that enables everything else.

But will defenders see it?

Most organisations don’t have:

  • Real-time RPKI audit log monitoring

  • Alerting on ROA creation for prefixes they don’t control

  • Correlation between ROA changes and BGP announcements

RPKI CA audit logs exist but weren’t monitored. ROA changes were logged but not alerted on. Validation state changed propagate slowly (30-90 minutes).

A scenario that makes this obviously detectable is lying about defender capabilities.

A better scenario emits:

  • ROA creation log (JSON event, timestamped, but not obviously malicious)

  • Validator state change 30 minutes later (prefix transitions to “not found” for victim, “valid” for attacker)

  • BGP announcement that correlates with ROA change (but only if defenders think to correlate)

Defenders must connect these dots themselves. The scenario doesn’t do it for them.

Narrative